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OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:  
 Appellant Karen Cappuccio appeals an unfavorable 
jury verdict on her complaint under the Truth In Lending Act 
(“TILA”), 15 U.S.C § 1601 et seq., against Appellee E*Trade 
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for its failure to properly notify her of her right to cancel her 
home mortgage.  Cappuccio challenges various aspects of the 
jury instructions, including the District Court’s directive that 
because her signature was on the notice of right to cancel, 
“something more than just [her] testimony . . . is needed to 
rebut the presumption that she received” the notice.  Because 
we find no basis in TILA or the Federal Rules of Evidence for 
this portion of the instruction, and because we do not find the 
error to be harmless, we will vacate the verdict and remand 
for a new trial on her rescission claim. 
 
I. 
A. Background 
 In 2006, Appellant Karen Cappuccio sought to 
refinance the mortgages on her home in Hellertown, 
Pennsylvania, while interest rates were low.  She had two 
existing mortgages on her home: a 30-year 6.38% fixed-
interest loan and a 30-year 11.2% fixed-interest loan.  
Cappuccio hoped to combine these two loans into a single 
mortgage with a lower monthly payment and interest rate, 
while receiving an additional $20,000 to $25,000 with which 
to make home improvements.  Later, at trial, Cappuccio 
sought to introduce evidence that she had specifically sought 
a 30-year 5% fixed-interest mortgage in the amount of 
approximately $165,000, but was precluded from doing so by 
an evidentiary ruling of the District Court. 
 
 While exploring the options for refinancing, 
Cappuccio responded to an advertisement on the internet by 
providing information about her existing mortgages as well as 
the type of refinancing she was interested in obtaining.  
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Shortly thereafter, she received a phone call from an 
individual named Kirk Ayzenberg, who was a loan agent for a 
brokerage firm called Prime Capital Funding LLC (“Prime 
Capital”).  Ayzenberg told Cappuccio that he had received 
her information and could help her obtain the kind of loan she 
was interested in.  Shortly after, Prime Capital submitted a 
Universal Residential Loan Application on behalf of 
Cappuccio to lender Countrywide Bank, NA for both a 30-
year 5% fixed-interest loan and a 30-year 4.75% fixed-
interest loan.  Prime Capital also submitted a loan application 
on behalf of Cappuccio to lender First Magnus Financial 
(“First Magnus”) for a 20-year 11.5% fixed-interest loan.  
Cappuccio later testified that she did not want two separate 
mortgages on her home and that Prime Capital did not tell her 
that it was submitting applications for two different loans.  
 
 After receiving Cappuccio’s loan application, 
Countrywide generated a new application which resulted in 
an offer of a 30-year adjustable, “negative amortizing loan”1
                                                 
1 A “negative amortizing loan” is a loan where payments 
made during the first few years of the mortgage are less than 
the interest accrued by the borrower, thus increasing the size 
of the principal beyond its original amount.  James Charles 
Smith, The Structural Causes of Mortgage Fraud, 60 
Syracuse L. Rev. 473, 495 (2010).  
 
with a 9.95% interest rate ceiling and an initial one month 
“teaser” rate of 4.75%.  Countrywide did not inform 
Cappuccio that it was not processing the original loan 
applications, nor that it was offering her a more complex and 
expensive mortgage.  First Magnus Financial rejected the 
application it was sent by Prime Capital and instead it 
provided Cappuccio with a 15-year 13.477% interest loan that 
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included a $40,727 “balloon” payment due at the time of the 
last loan payment.  First Magnus did not notify Cappuccio of 
the differences between the loan it offered her and the loan 
for which she had applied.  
 
 The lenders, Countrywide and First Magnus, hired 
MAK Abstract as the title agent to close Cappuccio’s loans.  
MAK Abstract then hired Maureen Krajczar, a notary in 
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, to act as the closing agent.  
Ayzenberg told Cappuccio that she would meet with Krajczar 
on the evening of November 3, 2006, at Krajczar’s house, in 
order to go through all of the paperwork for the closing.  
Cappuccio testified that she and Krajczar sat at Krajczar’s 
kitchen table, alone together, as Krajczar passed Cappuccio 
various documents one at a time, directed her attention to the 
signature page, asked Cappuccio to “sign, date here, sign, 
date here, sign, date here” for each, before taking the 
documents away.  (App. 270-71).  Cappuccio testified that the 
process felt rushed and very hasty, and that Krajczar never 
explained any of the documents to her.  She further testified 
that when she asked Krajczar questions, Krajczar stated that 
she had to remain neutral and therefore could not answer 
them.  Cappuccio acknowledged at trial that she signed a 
Notice of Right to Cancel (hereinafter a “notice”) for each 
loan on the night of the closing, but testified that she did not 
understand what they meant or signified at the time she 
signed them. 
 
 The notices stated: 
YOUR RIGHT TO CANCEL: 
You are entering a transaction that will result in 
a mortgage, lien or security interest on/in your 
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home.  You have a legal right under federal law 
to cancel this transaction, without cost, within 
three business days from whichever of the 
following events occurs last: 
 
1. the date of the transaction, which is 
NOVEMBER 3, 2006; or 
2. the date you receive your Truth in Lending 
disclosures; or 
3. the date you receive this notice of your right 
to cancel. 
…  
If you cancel by mail or telegram, you must 
send a notice no later than midnight of 
NOVEMBER 07, 2006 (or midnight of the 
third business day following the latest of the 
three events listed above).  If you send or 
deliver your written notice to cancel some other 
way, it must be delivered to the above address 
no later than that time.  
… 
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT 
 
BY SIGNING BELOW, I, THE 
UNDERSIGNED, HEREBY 
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT ON THE DATE 
LISTED ABOVE I RECEIVED TWO (2) 
COMPLETED COPIES OF THIS NOTICE OF 
RIGHT TO CANCEL IN THE FORM 
PRESCRIBED BY LAW ADVISING ME OF 
MY RIGHT TO CANCEL THIS 
TRANSACTION. 
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(App. 62-63). 
 
 Cappuccio testified that about 40 minutes after she 
arrived, having completed all of the paperwork, she left 
Krajczar’s house without any documents from the closing in 
her possession.  Krajczar could not recall any of the details of 
Cappuccio’s closing, but testified that in accordance with her 
normal practices and Countrywide’s policy, she is confident 
she would have given Cappuccio the correct number of copies 
of the notices and Truth in Lending statement to take with her 
from the closing.  Krajczar also testified that, typically, a 
closing like Cappuccio’s that involved two loans would take 
an hour and a half to two hours. 
 
 According to Cappuccio, by November 8, when the 
loan proceeds were disbursed, she had not yet received copies 
of the notices or Truth in Lending statements.  She testified 
that a UPS package from MAK Abstract arrived the next day, 
November 9, containing a $14,000 check, loan documents, a 
single copy of the notice, and a Truth in Lending statement 
for the Countrywide loan.  Cappuccio observed that the terms 
of the loan listed were not what she expected.  She also saw 
the bolded date, “November 07, 2006,” which she incorrectly 
read as the last day for her to rescind her loan.  She therefore 
believed it was too late to cancel the loan.   
 
 Cappuccio further testified that two copies of the 
notice and a Truth in Lending statement for the First Magnus 
loan arrived in a UPS package on November 14.  She stated 
that an additional $2,000 check came in a separate envelope.  
Cappuccio again mistakenly believed that she could no longer 
rescind the loan because November 7 had passed.  In contrast, 
Michael Kuldiner, owner of MAK Abstract, testified that the 
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two UPS packages they sent to Cappuccio each contained 
only one check, no notices or other loan documents, and that 
he has never sent loan documents to borrowers in the manner 
Cappuccio described.  
 
 On August 15, 2007, Cappuccio, through her counsel, 
sought to rescind both loans.  Countrywide and E*Trade 
Bank, the assignee of the First Magnus loan, both refused to 
honor her claimed rescission or make restitution.  Cappuccio 
then filed suit. 
 
B. The trial 
 Cappuccio brought claims against the lenders, 
Countrywide and First Magnus, for (1) damages, rescission, 
and injunctive relief under TILA; (2) common law fraud; (3) 
statutory fraud under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices 
Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), 73 P.S. § 201-2; and 
(4) violations of the adverse action notice requirement of the 
U.S. Equal Opportunity Act (“EOA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1691.  
Cappuccio also brought claims for damages, rescission, and 
injunctive relief under TILA against Appellee E*Trade, the 
assignee, and Homecoming Financial LLC, the servicer of the 
First Magnus loan (hereinafter jointly referred to as 
“E*Trade”).2
                                                 
2 While Appellee argues in footnote 2 of its opposition brief 
that Homecoming Financial, as servicer, is not liable under 15 
U.S.C. § 1641(f) of TILA, it does not cite to any place in the 
record, other than the pleadings, where this contention was 
raised before the District Court.  Accordingly, we leave this 
issue for the parties and the District Court to resolve upon 
remand.   
  Finally, Cappuccio brought claims for statutory 
9 
 
fraud under the UTPCPL against the title agent, MAK 
Abstract, the broker, Prime Capital, and the loan agent, Kirk 
Ayzenberg, as well as common law fraud against the latter 
two.   
 
 A jury trial was held in September 2008.  As to the 
fraud claims, the jury awarded Cappuccio a verdict in the 
amount of $40,000 against Countrywide for common law 
fraud and statutory fraud under the UTPCPL, as well as 
$50,000 (including $10,000 in punitive damages) for 
violations of the adverse action notice requirement of the 
EOA.  Cappuccio did not bring those same fraud claims 
against E*Trade because it was only the assignee of the loan, 
not the original lender. 
 
 As to the TILA rescission claim, Cappuccio sought to 
prove that she did not receive the notices of her right cancel at 
the closing, and further, that to the extent she did receive the 
notices in the mail after the closing, they were not clear and 
conspicuous because they listed the wrong final rescission 
date and because they were received only after the loan funds 
had been disbursed, thus triggering a three-year extension of 
her right to rescind the mortgages.   
 
 To determine whether the District Court erred when it 
instructed the jury that something more than just Cappuccio’s 
testimony was needed to rebut the presumption that she 
received the notice, we set forth the verdict sheet the jury 
considered along with the instructions given by the District 
Court.  As to the TILA rescission claim, the verdict sheet 
asked the jury the following questions: 
 
 1. Do you find by the preponderance 
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of the evidence that the First Magnus 
Defendants provided Ms. Cappuccio with two 
copies of the Notice of Right to Cancel on 
November 3, 2006, the date of the loan closing? 
  
  Answer: ____ Yes      ____ No 
 
[If the answer to question 1 is yes, please 
STOP, you are finished with the TILA section] 
 
 2. Do you find by the preponderance 
of the evidence that the First Magnus 
Defendants provided Ms. Cappuccio with two 
copies of the Notice of Right to Cancel after 
November 3, 2006, the date of the loan closing? 
    
   Answer: ____ Yes      ____ No 
 
[If the answer to question 2 is yes, please 
continue to question 3, if the answer to question 
2 is no, please continue to [a question regarding 
statutory damages].] 
 
 3. If you find by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the First Magnus Defendants 
provided Ms. Cappuccio with two copies of the 
Notice of Right to Cancel after November 3, 
2006, do you find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the Notices would have clearly 
and conspicuously informed a reasonable 
consumer of his or her right to cancel the loans? 
 
  Answer: ____ Yes      ____ No 
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[If the answer to question 3 is yes, please 
STOP, you are finished with the TILA section] 
  
(App. 52) (emphasis added).   
 
 Instruction 18 of the jury instructions directed the jury 
as follows with regard to question 1:  
 
18. TILA Presumption 
 Where the borrower signs a document 
acknowledging that she received two copies of 
the Notice of Right to Cancel, a presumption 
that she actually did receive them arises.  A 
presumption shifts the burden of proving a 
particular fact to the party opposing its 
existence.  In a TILA case, something more than 
just the testimony of the borrower is needed to 
rebut the presumption that she received two 
copies of the Notice.  In addition, the lender 
does not have to give the borrower two copies 
of the Notice at the closing.  It can satisfy its 
obligations under TILA by mailing it to the 
borrower after the closing. 
 Since Plaintiff signed an 
acknowledgement that she received two copies 
of the Notice from both Countrywide and the 
First Magnus defendants on November 3, 2006, 
she is presumed to have received the copies. 
 
(App. 17) (emphasis added). 
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 The jury answered “yes” to question 1 on the verdict 
sheet, finding that Cappuccio had received the notices on 
November 3.  As a result, the jury never reached questions 2 
or 3, returning a verdict in favor of the lenders on the TILA 
claim.  On March 13, 2009, the District Court, 
notwithstanding the verdict, dismissed all claims against 
Countrywide pursuant to a post-trial settlement it had reached 
with Cappuccio.  That same day the District Court entered 
judgment in favor of E*Trade on the TILA rescission claim.  
Although on March 17, 2009, the District Court granted 
Cappuccio’s motion for an entry of default judgment against 
the remaining defendants, Prime Capital, Ayzenberg, and 
MAK Abstract, and scheduled a hearing to determine 
damages, in October Cappuccio voluntarily dismissed her 
claims against those defendants, apparently to hasten her 
appeal against E*Trade.   
 
II.3
A. The motion to dismiss the appeal. 
 
As a threshold matter, E*Trade moves to dismiss 
Cappuccio’s appeal.  It argues that the District Court’s 
issuance of a default judgment against Prime Capital, 
Ayzenberg, and MAK Abstract on March 13, 2009 resolved 
the last remaining claims in the case, and was therefore the 
Court’s “final order,” despite the fact that the District Court 
did not characterize it as such.  E*Trade contends that this 
                                                 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter under the 
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e), as well as 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction over Cappuccio’s appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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makes Cappuccio’s October 16, 2009 Notice of Appeal 
untimely under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(a)(1)(A), which permits 30 days to appeal a “final order.” 
 
 The initial flaw in E*Trade’s argument is that although 
judgment had been entered as to all claims and all defendants 
on March 13, 2009, there had been no determination of the 
amount of damages owed by each of the defaulting 
defendants.  “We have previously recognized that, ‘[i]t is a 
well-established rule of appellate jurisdiction . . . that where 
liability has been decided but the extent of damage remains 
undetermined, there is no final order.’”  DeJohn v. Temple 
Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Apex 
Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 27 F.3d 931, 934-35 (3d Cir. 
1994)).  Here, because the District Court was still in the midst 
of determining the “extent of damage,” Cappuccio argues 
there was no final order until October of 2009, when she 
voluntarily dismissed her claims against the defaulting 
defendants. 
 
 E*Trade responds by noting that Cappuccio sought 
damages from the defaulting defendants in the liquidated 
amount of $40,000, which the jury had awarded her on her 
UTPCPL claim against Countrywide.  (Doc. # 108, 1).  
E*Trade argues that because the liability of the three 
defaulting defendants is joint and several with Countrywide, 
the remaining allocation of damages between those parties 
was a mere “ministerial” task of setting off from the $40,000 
the amount that Countrywide had paid in its settlement and 
allocating the remainder to the defaulting defendants.  
E*Trade cites to Hattersley v. Bolt, 512 F.2d 209, 212-14 (3d 
Cir. 1975), where we held that regardless of the allocation of 
damages among defendants, when both liability and the total 
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amount of damages owed have been established for those 
defendants, “payment awaits only a future ministerial order, 
[and] finality is not lacking.”  Id. at 214. 
 
 We do not find Hattersley to be applicable, however, 
because the District Court here still had more than a 
ministerial task before it.  Although the defaulting defendants 
argued at the damages hearing and in their subsequent filings 
that they were entitled to a “set off” from liability equal to the 
amount Cappuccio had already received in her settlement 
with Countrywide, Cappuccio disputed this contention in her 
opposition to the motion to strike the default judgments, 
arguing that the jury awarded her $40,000 in damages based 
on Countrywide’s fraudulent actions alone, which were 
different from the actions that the defaulting defendants were 
alleged to have taken.  (Doc. # 157, 11-12).  While we need 
not determine which party would have prevailed on this 
question, the important point for purposes of finality is that 
the District Court had not yet ruled on this question of law 
and therefore, unlike Hattersley, it had more than a mere 
ministerial task before it.  Even if E*Trade were correct that 
Cappuccio’s position as to the “set off” was clearly wrong, it 
is important that the finality of a judgment not rest on the 
parties’ often subjective views of whether a still-outstanding 
damages issue is a close one, on the one hand, or easily 
resolved, on the other.  The rule in Hattersley must be 
narrowly limited to those circumstances where the remaining 
task for the District Court is truly ministerial, in the sense of 
requiring no independent legal judgment.  A broader rule 
would prove both impractical and unfair, forcing would-be 
appellants to make uncertain and risky determinations about 
whether a judgment is truly final.  See Grider v. Keystone 
Health Plan Central, Inc., 580 F.3d 119, 132 (3d Cir. 2009) 
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(“The finality requirement should be given a ‘practical rather 
than a technical construction.’”) (quoting Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981)).  
Accordingly, Hattersley is not controlling here and there was 
no “final order” until October of 2009.4  Cappuccio’s appeal 
is timely.5
 
   
B. The Truth in Lending Act 
 Congress expressly provided that the purposes of 
enacting TILA were “to assure a meaningful disclosure of 
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare 
more readily the various credit terms available to him . . . and 
to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit . . 
. practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).  We have paraphrased 
TILA’s purpose by stating that “Congress enacted TILA to 
                                                 
4We also note that the District Court had dismissed 
Cappuccio’s request for treble damages without prejudice, 
with leave to raise the issue again at the damages hearing, 
which had been partially completed and then adjourned.  
(Doc. # 152, 1).  Thus, the treble damages issue had also not 
been finally resolved by the time of the October 13 voluntary 
dismissals. 
 
5 Both parties have moved for damages and costs pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.  E*Trade argues that 
Cappuccio’s appeal is frivolous because it was clearly 
untimely, and Cappuccio argues that E*Trade’s motion to 
dismiss her appeal was frivolous because of longstanding 
precedent that a judgment is not final until damages have 
been determined.  Because neither the appeal nor the motion 
to dismiss the appeal can fairly be characterized as frivolous, 
we deny both motions.   
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guard against the danger of unscrupulous lenders taking 
advantage of consumers through fraudulent or otherwise 
confusing practices.”  Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 
156 F.3d 499, 502 (3d Cir. 1998).  Accordingly, because 
“TILA is a remedial statute and should be construed liberally 
in favor of the consumer.”  Id.  
 
 With certain exceptions not present here, TILA 
requires that a creditor in a consumer transaction disclose 
various items of information, including, among other things: 
(1) the identity of the creditor; (2) the “amount financed;” (3) 
the “finance charge;” (4) the “annual percentage rate;” (5) the 
sum of the amount financed and the finance charge, or “total 
of payments;” (6) the number, amount, and due dates or 
period of payments scheduled; (7) the “total sale price;” and 
(8) explanations and definitions of the foregoing terms.  See 
15 U.S.C. § 1638; 12 C.F.R. § 226.18. 
 
 In addition to the required disclosures, “TILA 
generally permits a consumer borrower to rescind a loan 
transaction that results in the creditor taking a security interest 
in the borrower’s principal dwelling.”  In re Porter, 961 F.2d 
1066, 1073 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a)).  The 
default three-day period during which the borrower may 
rescind the loan is intended to provide a “‘cooling off’ period 
during which . . . consumers [can] change their minds . . . .”  
Id. at 1068 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a)).  “The creditor must 
‘clearly and conspicuously disclose’ the borrower’s rescission 
rights and provide forms for the borrowers to do so, in 
accordance with regulations promulgated by the [Federal 
Reserve] Board.”  Id. at 1073 (citing § 1635(a)).  “The 
Board’s regulations require lenders to deliver to borrowers 
two copies of a notice of the right to rescind, and the notice 
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must clearly and conspicuously disclose”:  
 
 (1) The retention or acquisition of a security 
interest in the consumer’s principal dwelling. 
 (2) The consumer’s right to rescind the 
transaction. 
 (3) How to exercise the right to rescind, with a 
form for that purpose, designating the address 
of the creditor’s principal place of business. 
 (4) The effects of rescission, as described in 
paragraph (d) of this section. 
 (5) The date the rescission period expires. 
 
Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b)).  This regulation, at 12 
C.F.R. § 226.1 et seq., is also known as “Regulation Z.”  In re 
Cmty. Bank of North Va., 622 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2010).  
“Under the statute and regulations, if the lender’s notice is 
proper, the borrower’s right to rescind lasts for three days[.]”  
In re Porter, 961 F.2d at 1073.  The Official Staff 
Interpretations of Regulation Z, § 226.23, Supp. I, cmt. 
23(b)(4), provides that the lender may deliver the notice after 
the transaction, but that if it does so, the rescission period of 
three days “will not begin to run until the notice is given.”  
Further, “the rescission period extends to three years if the 
required notice and material disclosures (the annual 
percentage rate, [etc.]) are not delivered.”  In re Porter, 961 
F.2d at 1073 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) and 15 U.S.C. § 
1635(f)).  It is Cappuccio’s primary contention that the 
lenders failed to timely provide her with compliant notices, 
thus triggering this three-year extension of the rescission 
period.     
 
 Finally, of relevance here, when a borrower signs a 
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“written acknowledgment of receipt” of the aforementioned 
disclosures required by TILA, his or her signature “does no 
more than create a rebuttable presumption of delivery 
thereof.”  15 U.S.C. § 1635(c).  This provision was the basis 
for the District Court’s instruction to the jury that Cappuccio 
was presumed to have received the notices and that something 
more than her testimony was necessary to rebut that 
presumption. 
 
C. The presumption of receipt 
1. Whether the instruction was erroneous 
 Cappuccio argues that the District Court erred when it 
instructed the jury that “[i]n a TILA case, something more 
than just the testimony of the borrower is needed to rebut the 
presumption that she received two copies of the Notice.”  
(App. 18).6
 
  
 Federal Rule of Evidence 301 provides the default rule 
for rebutting a presumption in a civil case.  Rule 301 states: 
 
In all civil actions and proceedings not 
otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or 
by these rules, a presumption imposes on the 
party against whom it is directed the burden of 
going forward with evidence to rebut or meet 
the presumption, but does not shift to such party 
                                                 
6 “We exercise plenary review in determining ‘whether the 
jury instructions stated the proper legal standard.’”  United 
States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 642 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
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the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of 
nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the 
trial upon the party on whom it was originally 
cast. 
 
In other words, unless Congress or the Rules of Evidence 
provide otherwise, “a presumption in a civil case imposes the 
burden of production on the party against whom it is directed, 
but does not shift the burden of persuasion.”  McCann v. 
Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 2006); 
see also In re G-I Holdings, Inc., 385 F.3d 313, 318 (3d Cir. 
2004) (same).  Under this theory, called the “ThayerWigmore 
‘bursting bubble’ theory of presumptions[,] . . . ‘the 
introduction of evidence to rebut a presumption destroys that 
presumption, leaving only that evidence and its inferences to 
be judged against the competing evidence and its inferences 
to determine the ultimate question at issue.’”  McCann, 458 
F.3d at 287-88 (quoting McKenna v. Pac. Rail Serv., 32 F.3d 
820, 829-30 (3d Cir. 1994)).  “This view of Rule 301 is 
widely accepted.”  Id. at 288 (collecting cases and treatise 
sources).  But see 21B Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, § 5122.2 (disagreeing with the 
majority view).  
 
 Further, the quantum of evidence needed to “burst” the 
presumption’s “bubble” under Rule 301 is also minimal, 
given that “the presumption’s only effect is to require the 
party [contesting it] to produce enough evidence 
substantiating [the presumed fact’s absence] to withstand a 
motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law 
on the issue.”  McCann, 458 F.3d at 288.  We have previously 
held that a single, non-conclusory affidavit or witness’s 
testimony, when based on personal knowledge and directed at 
20 
 
a material issue, is sufficient to defeat summary judgment or 
judgment as a matter of law.  See, e.g., Kirleis v. Dickie, 
McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 161-63 (3d Cir. 
2009).  This remains true even if the affidavit is “self-
serving” in the sense of supporting the affiant’s own legal 
claim or interests.  Id.  Here, Cappuccio’s testimony related 
directly to a material issue in her TILA claim: whether she 
received two copies of a notice of the right to rescind her First 
Magnus loan when she left Krajczar’s house on the night of 
the closing.  Her testimony was also obviously based on her 
personal knowledge and was in no way conclusory.  
Accordingly, under Rule 301, her testimony would appear to 
be sufficient to burst the presumption’s bubble, leaving the 
decision of whether to credit her testimony, or that of 
E*Trade’s witnesses, to the jury.  
 
 However, by its own terms, Rule of Evidence 301 
states that it applies only where “not otherwise provided for 
by Act of Congress . . . .”  Accordingly, E*Trade could 
support the District Court’s presumption instruction if it could 
show that Congress “otherwise provided” for a stronger 
presumption than that provided for by default under Rule 301.  
Yet E*Trade cites to no language in TILA or any other act 
that would demonstrate Congress’s intent to create a stronger 
presumption.  Nor is there any such language in Regulation Z.  
To the contrary, Cappuccio convincingly argues that the 
language in § 1635(c), “does no more than create,” indicates 
that the provision is intended to construct the weakest form of 
presumption possible.  Further, Cappuccio argues that 
elsewhere in TILA, Congress used plain and unambiguous 
language to create stronger presumptions when it intended to 
do so.  For instance, § 1641(b) provides that in determining 
whether an assignee has acquired an obligation under TILA, 
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“written acknowledgement of receipt by a person to whom a 
statement is required to be given pursuant to this subchapter 
shall be conclusive proof of the delivery thereof . . . .” 
(emphasis added).  Cappuccio persuasively concludes that the 
words, “does no more than,” indicate an intent to apply the 
normal presumption provided for by Rule of Evidence 301, 
and not something “more than” that.  
 
 In sum, because of the plain language of TILA, and the 
resulting conclusion that Congress did not intend something 
other than a Rule 301 presumption to apply, we hold that the 
testimony of a borrower alone is sufficient to overcome 
TILA’s presumption of receipt.   
 
2. Harmless error 
 E*Trade argues that even if the District Court erred in 
requiring something more than Cappuccio’s testimony to 
rebut the presumption of receipt, that error was harmless, 
given that Cappuccio presented to the jury “something more 
than just [her] testimony” that she never received the notices 
on the night of the closing.  Specifically, it references the 
November 14 overnight UPS envelope from First Magnus 
that Cappuccio alleges also contained the disclosure forms 
and notices that should have been given to her on the night of 
the closing, as well as Cappuccio’s testimony before the jury 
that she received the notices in that envelope eleven days 
after the closing.   
 
 E*Trade’s argument is unconvincing.  First, the jury 
should have been permitted to weigh all of the evidence as it 
saw fit without any instruction as to the appropriate weight to 
be given to one piece or another.  Yet because the jury was 
22 
 
instructed that Cappuccio’s testimony about what she 
received on the night of the closing was not weighty enough 
by itself to rebut the presumption, it could reasonably also 
have understood the instruction to imply that the same 
testimony must carry little weight even when considered in 
tandem with the other favorable evidence in the case, 
including the physical UPS envelope and Cappuccio’s own 
testimony that she received the notices in the mail on 
November 14.  In other words, we think it quite possible that 
the instruction affected the jury’s weighing of Cappuccio’s 
testimony, whether the jury evaluated the testimony in 
isolation or in combination with other favorable evidence that 
was material to the issue of receipt.  Thus, we find that the 
presence of additional evidence in Cappuccio’s favor does not 
necessarily make the instruction any less prejudicial. 
 
 Furthermore, we believe the jury could have 
reasonably interpreted the instruction to refer not only to 
Cappuccio’s testimony about the closing, but also to her 
testimony about what she received in the mail on November 
14.  After all, the language “something more than just the 
testimony of the borrower” logically encompasses 
Cappuccio’s testimony about what she received in the mail on 
November 14.  Thus, the jury could easily have interpreted 
the instruction to mean that neither Cappuccio’s testimony 
about what she received on the night of the closing, nor her 
testimony about what she received in the mail days later, was 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of receipt.  
 
 Finally, we also reject E*Trade’s position that had the 
correct instruction been given, the jury verdict would surely 
have been in its favor, given the weight of the evidence.  The 
question of whether Cappuccio received the notices on the 
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night of the closing ultimately depends on whether the 
factfinder believes the testimony of Cappuccio or Krajczar, 
which in turn necessitates multiple subtle credibility 
determinations.  For this Court, on appeal, to attempt to 
extrapolate or predict what the jury’s credibility findings 
would have been under a proper instruction would be entirely 
speculative.  Because “we cannot say that there is a high 
probability that the error did not affect the outcome of the 
case[,]” Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 931 (3d 
Cir. 1997), we conclude that the error was not harmless. 
 
D. Additional references to the presumption 
 Cappuccio further argues that the jury instruction was 
erroneous or confusing because the District Court repeatedly 
referred to a presumption that Cappuccio received the notices 
on November 3, despite the fact that the presumption should 
have been deemed to have “dropped out” of the case once she 
met her burden of production by testifying that she did not, in 
fact, receive the notices on November 3. 
 
 As explained above, we have previously held that “a 
presumption in a civil case imposes the burden of production 
on the party against whom it is directed, but does not shift the 
burden of persuasion.”  McCann, 458 F.3d at 287.  “Under 
this theory, ‘the introduction of evidence to rebut a 
presumption destroys that presumption, leaving only that 
evidence and its inferences to be judged against the 
competing evidence and its inferences to determine the 
ultimate question at issue.’”  Id. at 288 (quoting McKenna, 32 
F.3d at 830 (3d Cir. 1994)) (emphasis added); see also, 2 
McCormick on Evid. § 344 (6th ed. 2009) (“The trial judge 
need only determine that the evidence introduced in rebuttal 
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is sufficient to support a finding contrary to the presumed 
fact.  If that determination is made, certainly there is no need 
to instruct the jury with regard to the presumption.”) 
(emphasis added).   
 
 Of course, as the plaintiff, Cappuccio still bears the 
underlying burden of persuasion in proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that she did not receive the 
notices.  And the jury may still consider and weigh as 
evidence the fact that the notices were signed by Cappuccio, 
as well as all “inferences properly drawn therefrom.”  
McCann, 458 F.3d at 288 n.5 (internal quotation omitted).  
Cappuccio’s burden of persuasion, however, which was 
explained to the jury elsewhere in the instructions, should not 
be supplemented by language about a presumption of non-
receipt, which could potentially confuse the jury by implying 
that something more than a mere preponderance of the 
evidence was needed to prove non-receipt.   
 
 Indeed, as a matter of good practice, where a party has 
produced sufficient facts to rebut a Rule 301 presumption, 
and it drops out of the case, the District Court should avoid 
references to such a presumption in its instructions.7
                                                 
7 Cappuccio also objects to the District Court’s ruling that the 
parol evidence rule prevented her from introducing evidence 
of representations and promises made to her about favorable 
loan terms that she never ultimately received.  She argues on 
appeal that the modification of the terms—what she calls the 
“bait and switch”—was the lenders’ motive for delaying 
delivery of the notices, which in turn was the factual basis of 
her TILA claim.  However, in opposing the District Court’s 
parol evidence ruling, it does not appear that Cappuccio’s 
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E. The completeness of the instructions 
 Finally, Cappuccio argues that the District Court erred 
when it instructed the jury that the lenders could satisfy their 
obligations under TILA by mailing the notices to Cappuccio 
after the closing, without also instructing that: (1) if they did 
so, the three-day rescission period would not begin to run 
until the notices were received; (2) that the lenders must 
provide the correct date for the expiration of the right of 
rescission on the notice; and (3) that the lenders must delay 
disbursement of the funds until the rescission period has 
passed. 
 
 Here, however, Instruction 17 states that the “[n]otice 
must inform borrowers that they may cancel their loan within 
three business days of the loan closing or the date on which 
they receive the Notice, whichever occurs later.”  (App. 16) 
(emphasis added).  This language adequately conveys the law 
as to the tolling of the rescission period.  Further, Instruction 
19 states that the “Notice of Right to Cancel must clearly and 
conspicuously disclose . . . [t]he date the rescission period 
expires.”  (App. 18).  This adequately explains that the date 
the rescission period ends must be accurately displayed on the 
notice.  Finally, we have previously held that while 
                                                                                                             
counsel ever squarely raised the alleged relevance of the 
change in the loan terms for her TILA claim.  Accordingly, 
upon retrial we leave it to Cappuccio to raise before the 
District Court her argument for why the modified loan terms 
are relevant to her TILA claim, and for the Court to 
determine, in the first instance, whether such evidence falls 
within the scope of the parol evidence rule.     
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disbursement of the funds prior to the rescission date is a 
violation of § 226.23(c), it is not a violation of § 226.23(b) 
and therefore does not trigger the three-year extension of the 
rescission period.  Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 
898 F.2d 896, 904 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The two subsections, 
while adjacent in the C.F.R., are separate with a violation of 
only § 226.23(b) extending the rescissory period.”).  
Accordingly, the failure to instruct the jury on the timing of 
the disbursement was not error, given that premature 
disbursement does not lead to a three-year extension of the 
rescission period, the basis of Cappuccio’s rescission claim.  
As to these issues, the District Court did not misstate the law 
in its instructions or abuse its discretion.  
 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment 
of the District Court and remand for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
